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Abstract
We study peer eﬀects in education. We ﬁrst develop a network model that predicts
a relationship between own education and peers’ education as measured by direct links
in the social network. We then test this relationship using the four waves of the
AddHealth data, looking at the impact of school friends nominated in the ﬁrst wave
in 1994-1995 on own educational outcome reported in the fourth wave in 2007-2008.
We ﬁnd that there are strong and persistent peer eﬀects in education since a standard
deviation increase in peers’ education attainment translates into roughly a 10 percent
increase of a standard deviation in the individual’s education attainment (roughly 3.5
more months of education). We also ﬁnd that peer eﬀects are in fact signiﬁcant only
for adolescents who were friends in grades 10-12 but not for those who were friends in
grades 7-9. This might indicate that social norms are important in educational choice
since the individual’s choiceo fc o l l e g es e e m st ob ei n ﬂuenced by that of friends in the
two last years of high school.
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11 Introduction
The inﬂuence of peers on education outcomes has been widely recognized both in economics
and sociology. The extremely diﬃcult task is to disentangle neighborhood eﬀects from peer
eﬀects and there is no consensus on the importance of peer eﬀects on own achievement in
this literature (see, e.g. Goux and Maurin, 2007, and the two recent literature surveys by
Durlauf, 2004, Ioannides and Topa, 2010, and Ioannides, 2011). The constraints imposed
by the available disaggregated data force many studies to analyze peer eﬀects at a quite
aggregate and arbitrary level, such as at the school, grade or neighborhood level.1 This
leaves little chance to separate endogenous from exogenous (contextual) eﬀects. Besides, the
detections and measure of social interactions eﬀects is hampered by a possible endogenous
group (neighborhood) membership or by omitted variables problems. If the variables that
drive the sorting of individuals into neighborhoods are not fully observable, potential corre-
lations between (unobserved) factors and the target neighborhood level variables are a major
sources of bias.
A popular strategy is to use an instrumental variable approach. Indeed, several studies
eliminate the problem of correlation in unobservables at the neighborhood level by using
metropolitan-area level variables and exploiting cross-metropolitan variations (see e.g. Evans
et al., 1992; Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Card and Rothstein, 2007; Weinberg, 2004). It is
hard to guarantee, however, that metropolitan level variables do not directly aﬀect outcomes.
Bayer et al. (2008) adopt the converse research design by using data from the US Census that
characterize residential location down to the city block. They exploit block-level variation
in neighbor attributes, assuming the absence of correlation in unobservables across blocks
within block groups.2
Other studies are based on speciﬁc social experiments or quasi-experimental data (e.g.
Katz et al., 2001; Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman 2003). However, important concerns on the
external validity of these strategies in the identiﬁcation of neighborhood eﬀects remain (see
Moﬃtt, 2001, for a detailed discussion).
Recent papers (Bramoullé et al., 2009; Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009; Lin 2010; Liu et al.
2011; Patacchini and Zenou, 2012) systematically analyze the identiﬁcation of peer eﬀects in
social networks and show to what extent they can be separately identiﬁed from contextual
1Usually, peer eﬀects in education have been tested using a rather aggregate measure of peers such as
the “neighborhood”, which has been measured by the high school (Evans et al., 1992), the census tract
(Brooks-Gun et al., 1993), and the ZIP code (Datcher, 1982; Corcoran et al., 1992) where individuals reside.
2Another popular strategy is to estimate peer eﬀects in education using comparisons across cohorts within
schools. See, in particular, Bifulco et al. (2011).
2eﬀects using the variations in the reference groups across individuals, which is typical in
social contact network structure.3 In particular, Lin (2010) and Liu et al. (2011) present
a network model speciﬁcation and an empirical strategy that is closely related to the one
presented in this paper. Using data from the ﬁr s tw a v eo ft h eA d d H e a l t hs u r v e y ,t h e s e
studies provide an assessment of peer eﬀects in student academic performance (GPA) and
in crime, respectively. Following Lee et al. (2010), Lin (2010) adopts a maximum likelihood
estimation approach, whereas following Liu et Lee (2010), Liu et al (2011) use the 2SLS and
generalized method of moments (GMM) approaches.
Both approaches (Lin, 2010 and Liu et al., 2011), however, are based on the same identi-
ﬁcation strategy. They are valid under the assumption that link formation is correlated with
observed individual characteristics, contextual eﬀects and that any remaining (troubling)
source of unobserved heterogeneity can be captured at the network level, through the inclu-
sion of network ﬁxed eﬀects. They cannot deal with the possible presence of unobservable
within group individual characteristics, like unobserved individual preferences, that drive
both group choice and individual outcomes.
In this paper, we exploit the longitudinal structure of the AddHealth data, which allows a
more than 10-years time interval between friendship choice and educational outcomes More
speciﬁcally, we assess whether and to what extent peers (i.e. friends) during the teenage
period play a role for the individual’s future education attainment. Possible unobserved
student’s characteristics driving friends’ choice at school (i.e. common interests in sports or
other activities, cheap talking) are unlikely to remain important determinants of individual
decisions later on in life.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that exploits this comprehensive set
of information to assess peer eﬀects in education in this dynamic perspective.4 In addition,
we measure peer groups as precisely as possible by exploiting the directed nature of the
3A similar argument, i.e. the use of out-group eﬀects, to achieve the identiﬁcation of the endogenous
group eﬀect in the linear-in-means model has also been used by Weinberg et al. (2004), Cohen-Cole (2006),
Laschever (2009), and De Giorgi et al. (2010).
4Using the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study of Social and Psychological Factors in Aspiration and Attain-
ment (WLS), Zax and Rees (2002) also analyze the role of friendships in school on future earnings. Their
paper is quite diﬀerent than ours since they do not have a theoretical model driving the empirical analysis
and do not tackle the issue of endogenous sorting of individuals into groups. Using the British National Child
Development Study (NCDS), Patacchini and Zenou (2011) investigate the eﬀects of neighborhood quality (in
t e r m so fe d u c a t i o n )w h e nac h i l di st h i r t e e no nh i s / h e reducational outcomes when he/she is adult. Similarly,
Gould et al. (2011), using Israeli data, estimate the eﬀect of the early childhood environment on a large
array of social and economic outcomes lasting almost 60 years. In both studies, peer eﬀects are measured
by the neighborhood where people live and not by friendship nominations.
3nomination data and, furthermore, we allow peer eﬀects to be heterogeneous by exploiting
the nomination order. More speciﬁcally, we weight each individual contact according to the
nomination order so that individuals nominated ﬁrst have more weights than those nominated
later.
Our empirical investigation is guided by a theoretical social network model5 that ex-
tends that of Ballester et al. (2006) to the case of heterogenous agents in education.6 We
develop a local aggregate model where it is the sum of the eﬀorts of the peers that posi-
tively aﬀects individuals’ utility. We show that, in equilibrium, the topology of the network
totally characterizes peer eﬀects so that diﬀerent positions in the network imply diﬀerent
eﬀort levels. We are able to derive the best-reply function of each individual as a function
of peers’ eﬀects, own and peers characteristics and network speciﬁce ﬀect. We then test
this equation using the AddHealth data. We exploit four unique features of the AddHealth
data: (i) the nomination-based friendship information, which allows us to reconstruct the
precise geometry of social contacts, (ii) the directed nature of the nominations to measure
precisely peer groups, (iii) the nomination order, which enables us to consider heterogenous
inﬂuences within peer groups, (iv) the longitudinal dimension, which provides a temporal
interval between friends’ nomination and educational outcome.
We ﬁnd that there are strong and persistent peer eﬀects in education. In other words,
the “quality” of friends (in terms of future educational achievement) from high school has
a positive and signiﬁcant impact on own future education level. In terms of magnitude, we
ﬁnd that a standard deviation increase in peers’ aggregate years of education (roughly two
more high-school graduate friends) translates into roughly a 10 percent increase of a standard
deviation in the individual’s education attainment (roughly 3.5 more months of education).
This is a strong eﬀect, especially given our long list of controls and the fact that friendship
n e t w o r k sm i g h th a v ec h a n g e do v e rt i m e .I ti se v e ns t r o n g e rw h e nt h ep e e ri n ﬂuence is allowed
to be heterogenous in terms of order of nomination. The inﬂuence of peers at school seem
to be carried over time. We also analyze if the peer eﬀect results are stronger for friends in
earlier grades than in later ones. For that, we split our sample between students who were
in grades 7-9 and those who were in grades 10-12. We ﬁnd that peer eﬀects are signiﬁcant
for the latter but not for the former. This might indicate that social norms are important
in educational choice since the individual’s choice of college seems to be inﬂuenced by the
choice of college of friends in the two last years of high school. In other words, individuals
5See Goyal (2007) and Jackson (2008) for an overview on the theory of social networks.
6F o rp e e re ﬀect models in education, see the seminal contributions of De Bartoleme (1990) and Benabou
(1993).
4are more likely to adopt and pursue an objective (here educational choice) if this choice is
popular among their peers, especially in the last years at school.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 The model
We develop a network model of peer eﬀects, where the network reﬂects the collection of
active bilateral inﬂuences.
The network Nr = {1,...,n r} is a ﬁnite set of agents in network r (r =1 ,...,r), where
r is the total number of networks. We keep track of social connections by a matrix Gr =
{gij,r},w h e r egij,r =1if i and j a r ed i r e c tf r i e n d s ,a n dgij,r =0 , otherwise. Friendship are
reciprocal so that gij,r = gji,r. All our results hold for non-symmetric and weighted networks
but, for the ease of the presentation, we focus on symmetric and unweighted networks in the
theoretical model (even though we use directed weighted networks in the empirical analysis).
We also set gii,r =0 .
Preferences Individuals in network r decide how much eﬀort to exert in education
(e.g. how many hours to study). We denote by yi,r the educational eﬀort level of individual
i in network r and by yr =( y1,r,...,yn,r)0 the population eﬀort proﬁle in network r.E a c h
agent i selects an eﬀort yi,r ≥ 0, and obtains a payoﬀ ui,r(yr,g r) that depends on the eﬀort
proﬁle yr and on the underlying network gr, in the following way:









where φ>0. Two key aspects characterize the utility function ui,r(yr,g r) of individual i
in network r. There is the idiosyncratic exogenous part (ai,r + ηr + εi,r) yi,r − 1
2y2
i,r and the
endogenous peer eﬀect aspect φ
Pn
j=1 gij,ryi,ryj,r.I n( 1 ) ,ηr denotes the unobservable network
characteristics and εi,r is an error term, meaning that there is some uncertainty in the beneﬁt
part of the utility function. There is also an ex ante idiosyncratic heterogeneity, ai,r,w h i c h
is assumed to be deterministic, perfectly observable by all individuals in the network and
corresponds to the observable characteristics of individual i (like e.g. sex, race, age, parental
education, etc.) and to the observable average characteristics of individual i’s best friends,
i.e. average level of parental education of i’s friends, etc. (contextual eﬀects). To be more

















i is a set of M variables accounting for observable diﬀerences in individual character-
istics of individual i, βm,γm are parameters and gi,r =
Pn
j=1 gij,r is the total number of friends
individual i has in network r. The beneﬁts from the utility are given by (ai,r + ηr + εi,r) yi,r
and are increasing in own educational eﬀort yi,r.I n t h i s ﬁrst part, there is also a cost of
providing educational eﬀort, 1
2y2
i,r, which is also increasing in eﬀort yi,r. The second part
of the utility function is: φ
Pnr
j=1 gij,ryi,ryj,r,w h i c hr e ﬂects the inﬂuence of friends’ behavior
on own action. The peer eﬀect component is also heterogeneous, and this endogenous het-
erogeneity reﬂects the diﬀerent locations of individuals in the friendship network r and the
resulting eﬀort levels. More precisely, bilateral inﬂuences are captured by the following cross
derivatives, for i 6= j:
∂2ui,r(yr,g r)
∂yi,r∂yj,r
= φgij,r ≥ 0. (3)
When i and j are direct friends, the cross derivative is φ>0 and reﬂects strategic comple-
mentarity in eﬀorts. When i and j are not direct friends, this cross derivative is zero. In
particular, φ>0 means that if two students are friends, i.e. gij,r =1 ,a n di fj increases her
eﬀort, then i will experience an increase in her (marginal) utility if she also increases her
eﬀort. Interestingly, utility increases with the number of friends each person has, weighted
by eﬀorts xj,r.
To summarize, when individual i exerts some eﬀort in education, the beneﬁts of the ac-
tivity depends on individual characteristics ai,r, some network characteristics ηr a n do ns o m e
random element εi,r, which is speciﬁc to individual i. In other words, ai,r is the observable
part (by the econometrician) of i’s characteristics while εi,r captures the unobservable char-
acteristics of individual i. Note that the utility (1) is concave in own decisions, and displays
decreasing marginal returns in own eﬀort levels. In sum,
ui,r(yr,g r)=( ai,r + ηr + εi,r) yi,r | {z }














Beneﬁts from friends’ eﬀort
2.2 Nash equilibrium
We now characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game where agents choose their eﬀort
level yi,r ≥ 0 simultaneously. At equilibrium, each agent maximizes her utility (1). The
6corresponding ﬁrst-order conditions are:
ui,r(yr,g r)
∂yi,r








gij,ryj,r + ai,r + ηr + εi,r (4)
Denote by μ1(Gr) the spectral radius of Gr.W eh a v e :
Proposition 1 If φμ1(Gr) < 1,t h ep e e re ﬀect game with payoﬀs( 1 )h a sau n i q u eN a s h
equilibrium in pure strategies given by (4)
Proof. Apply Theorem 1, part b, in Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009) to our problem.
We would like now to test this model, especially equation (4), using data from adolescent
friendships in the US. In other words, we would like to see how strong are peer eﬀects in
education by estimating the magnitude of φ.
3 Data description
Our analysis is made possible by the use of a unique database on friendship networks from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (AddHealth).7
The AddHealth survey has been designed to study the impact of the social environment
(i.e. friends, family, neighborhood and school) on adolescents’ behavior in the United States
by collecting data on students in grades 7-12 from a nationally representative sample of
roughly 130 private and public schools in years 1994-95. Every pupil attending the sampled
schools on the interview day is asked to compile a questionnaire (in-school data) contain-
ing questions on respondents’ demographic and behavioral characteristics, education, family
7This research uses data from Add Health, a program project directed by Kathleen Mullan Harris and
designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National
Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with cooperative funding from 23 other federal agencies
and foundations. Special acknowledgment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in
the original design. Information on how to obtain the Add Health data ﬁles is available on the Add Health
website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth). No direct support was received from grant P01-HD31921 for
this analysis.
7background and friendship. This sample contains information on roughly 90,000 students.
A subset of adolescents selected from the rosters of the sampled schools, about 20,000 indi-
viduals, is then asked to compile a longer questionnaire containing more sensitive individual
and household information (in-home and parental data). Those subjects of the subset are
interviewed again in 1995—96 (wave II), in 2001—2 (wave III), and again in 2007-2008 (wave
IV).8
From a network perspective, the most interesting aspect of the AddHealth data is the
friendship information, which is based upon actual friends nominations. It is collected at
wave I, i.e. when individuals were at school. Indeed, pupils were asked to identify their
best friends from a school roster (up to ﬁve males and ﬁve females).9 As a result, one
can reconstruct the whole geometric structure of the friendship networks. Such a detailed
information on social interaction patterns allows us to measure the peer group more precisely
than in previous studies. Knowing exactly who nominates whom in a network, we exploit
the directed nature of the nominations data. We focus on choices made and we denote a
link from i to j as gij,r =1if i has nominated j as his/her friend in network r,a n dgij,r =0 ,
otherwise.10 In addition, we also exploit the nomination order to weight diﬀerently the
inﬂuence of each peer within peer groups, i.e. we consider heterogenous peer eﬀects. To the
best of our knowledge this information has not been used before. More speciﬁcally, we weight
each individual contact using a function which is linearly decreasing with the corresponding
order in the nomination list and also accounts for the total number of nominations made by




where ϑ denotes the order of nomination given by individual i to friend j in his/her nomina-
tion list while gi,r =
Pn
j=1 gij,r is the total number of nominations made by individual i.B y
d o i n gs o ,w ea l l o wf o rt h ef a c tt h a te a c hi n d i v i d u a lc a nb ea ﬀected diﬀerently by diﬀerent
peers within his/her peer group. For example, imagine that individual 1 has nominated
three friends (i.e. gi,r =3 ), say ﬁr s tf r i e n d2 ,t h e n4a n dt h e n3 . I nt h a tc a s e ,ϑ =1for
individual 2, ϑ =2for individual 4 and ϑ =3for individual 3. We will therefore have the
8The AddHealth website describes survey design and data in details.
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth
9The limit in the number of nominations is not binding (even by gender). Less than 0.1% of the students
in our sample show a list of ten best friends.
10As highlighted by Wasserman and Faust (1994), centrality indices for directional relationships generally
focus on choices made.
8following weights: w12,r =1 , w14,r =2 /3 and w13,r =1 /3 and therefore in the ﬁrst row of
the adjacency matrix Gr (for individual 1), there will be a 0 for individuals that 1 has not
nominated and a 1, 2/3 and 1/3 for individuals 2, 4 and 3, respectively.
By matching the identiﬁcation numbers of the friendship nominations to respondents’
identiﬁcation numbers, one can also obtain information on the characteristics of nominated
friends. In addition, the longitudinal structure of the survey provides information on both
respondents and friends during the adulthood. In particular, the questionnaire of wave IV
contains detailed information on the highest education qualiﬁcation achieved. We measure
education attainment in completed years of full time education.11 Social contacts (i.e. friend-
ship nominations) are, however, only collected in Wave I. Our ﬁnal sample of in-home wave
I students (and friends) that are followed over time and have non missing information on
our target variables both in waves I and IV consists of 1,319 individuals distributed over
138 networks. The minimum number of individuals in a network is 4 while its maximum is
100.12 The mean and the standard deviation of network size are roughly 9 and 14 individuals,
respectively.13
Table A.1 in Appendix 1 provides the descriptive statistics and deﬁnitions of the variables
used in our study.14 Among the individuals selected in our sample, 53% are female and 17%
are blacks. The average parental education is high school graduate. Roughly 10% have
parents working in a managerial occupation, another 10% in the oﬃce or sales sector, 20% in
a professional/technical occupation, and roughly 30% have parents in manual occupations.
More than 70% of our individuals come from household with two married parents, from an
household of about four people on average. At wave IV, 45% of our adolescents are now
married and roughly half of them (47%) have a son or a daughter. The mean intensity in
religion practice slightly decreases during the transition from adolescence to adulthood. On
11More precisely the Wave IV questionnaire asks the highest education qualiﬁcation achieved (distinguish-
ing between 8th grade or less, high school, vocational/technical training, bachelor’s degree, graduate school,
master’s degree, graduate training beyond a master’s degree, doctoral degree, post baccalaureate professional
education). Those with high school and above qualiﬁcation are also asked to report the exact year when the
highest qualiﬁcation was achieved. Such an information allows us to construct a reliable measure of each
individual’s completed years of education.
12We do not consider networks at the extremes of the network size distribution (i.e. composed by 2-3
individuals or by more than 100) because peer eﬀects can show extreme values (too hig or too low) in these
edge networks.
13On average, these adolescents declare having 1.46 friends with a standard deviation of 1.4.
14Information at the school level, such as school quality and teacher/pupil ratio is also available but we
don’t use it since our sample of networks are within schools and we use ﬁxed network eﬀects in our estimation
strategy.
9average, during their teenage years, our individuals felt that adults care about them and had
a good a good relationship teachers. Roughly, 30% of our adolescents were highly performing
individuals at school, i.e. had the highest mark in mathematics.
Before we start our empirical analysis, we would like to look at simple correlations between
the education attainment of an individual and the friends that he/she has nominated when
she/he was adolescent at school. Figure 1 documents this correlations by diﬀerentiating
between direct best friends (k =1 ), friends of friends (k =2 ), etc. One clearly sees that
the correlation curve is decreasing and is steeper when diﬀerent weights are put on friends
according to their nomination order. This indicates that direct friends’s education outcomes
have much more impact on own education outcome than indirect friends and that this relation
is stronger when the order of nomination is taken into account. For example, it can be seen
from Figure 1 that the correlation in education between an individual and his/her direct
friend is twice as high as between an individual and his/her indirect friend of length 8 (i.e.
k =8 ).
[Insert Figure 1 here]
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Empirical model
Let ¯ r be the total number of networks in the sample (r =1 3 8in our dataset), nr be
the number of individuals in the rth network, and n =
P¯ r
r=1 nr be the total number of
individuals (n =1 ,319 in our dataset). For i =1 ,···,n r and r =1 ,···, ¯ r, the empirical













j,r,tγ + ηr,t +  i,r,t+1, (5)
where yi,r,t+1 is the highest education level reached by individual i at time t+1who belonged
to network r at time t,w h e r et i m et +1refers to wave IV in 2007-2008 while time t refers
to wave I in 1994-95. Similarly, yj,r,t is the highest education level reached by individual j
at time t+1who has been nominated as his/her friend by individual i at time t in network
r. All the other variables have the same meaning as in equation (4) with the added new




the diﬀerent individual characteristics both at times t (e.g. self esteem, mathematics score,
quality of the neighborhood, etc.) and t+1(marital status, age, children, etc.) of individual
i. S o m ec h a r a c t e r i s t i c sa r ec l e a r l yt h es a m ea tt i m e st and t +1 , such as race, parents’
10education, gender, etc. Finally,  i,r’s are i.i.d. innovations with zero mean and variance σ2
for all i and r.
Observe that even if our theoretical model is static, as can be seen by (4), we use here a
dynamic formulation of (4) for both econometric (this prevents reverse causality problems)
and economic issues since we want to know how persistent are peer eﬀects over time. We
also adopt this strategy because we do not have information about the friendship network
at time t+1;w eh a v ei to n l ya tt i m et. Observe also that, in the data, yi,r,t+1 is the highest
education level reached by individual i while, in the model, yi,r is the educational eﬀort level
of individual i. It seems reasonable to approximate education eﬀort by education attained
since the two are strongly correlated.
In the next two sections, to avoid too cumbersome notations, we omit the time index.
4.2 Identiﬁcation strategy
The identiﬁcation of peer eﬀects (φ in model (5)) raises diﬀerent challenges.
In linear-in-means models, simultaneity in behavior of interacting agents introduces a
perfect collinearity between the expected mean outcome of the group and its mean char-
acteristics. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate between the eﬀect of peers’ choice of
eﬀort and peers’ characteristics that do impact on their eﬀo r tc h o i c e( t h es o - c a l l e dreﬂection
problem; see Manski, 1993). Basically, the reﬂection problem arises because, in the standard
approach, individuals interact in groups, that is individuals are aﬀected by all individuals
belonging to the same group and by nobody outside the group. In other words, groups
completely overlap. In the case of social networks, instead, this is nearly never true since
the reference group has individual-level variation. Formally, as shown by Bramoullé et al.
(2009), social eﬀects are identiﬁed (i.e. there is no reﬂection problem) if I, Gr and G2
r are
linearly independent where I is the identity matrix and G2
r keeps track of indirect connec-
tions of length 2 in network r. In other words, if i and j are friends and j and k are friends,
it does not necessarily imply that i and k are also friends. Denote Xr =( x1,r,···,x nr,r)0
and Yr =( y1,r,···,y nr,r)0. Then, because of these intransitivities, G2
rXr, G3
rXr, etc. are
not collinear with GrXr and they can therefore act as valid instruments. Take, for example,
individuals i, j and k in network r such that gij,r =1and gjk,r =1but gik,r =0 . In that case,
for individual i, the characteristics of peers of peers G2
rXr (i.e. xk,r) is a valid instrument
for peers’ behavior G2
rYr (i.e. yj,r)s i n c exk,r aﬀects yi,r only indirectly through its eﬀect
on yj,r (distance 2). The architecture of social networks implies that these attributes will
aﬀect each individual outcome only through their eﬀect on his/her friends’ outcomes. Even
11in linear-in-means models, the Manski’s (1993) reﬂection problem is thus eluded.15 Peer
eﬀects in social networks are thus identiﬁed and can be estimated using 2SLS or maximum
likelihood (Lee 2007; Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009; Lin, 2010).16
Although this setting allows us to solve the reﬂection problem, the estimation results
might still be ﬂawed because of the presence of unobservable factors aﬀecting both individual
and peer behaviors. It is indeed diﬃcult to disentangle the endogenous peer eﬀects from the
correlated eﬀects, i.e. eﬀects arising from the fact that individuals in the same network tend
to behave similarly because they face a common environment. If individuals are not randomly
assigned into networks, this problem might originate from the possible sorting of agents. If
the variables that drive this process of selection are not fully observable, potential correlations
between (unobserved) network-speciﬁc factors and the target regressors are major sources
of bias. A number of papers using network data have dealt with the estimation of peer
eﬀects with correlated eﬀects (e.g., Clark and Loheac 2007; Lee 2007; Calvó-Armengol et
al., 2009; Lin, 2010; Lee et al., 2011). This approach is based on the use of network ﬁxed
eﬀects and extends Lee (2003) 2SLS methodology. Network ﬁxed eﬀects can be interpreted
as originating from a two-step model of link formation where agents self-select into diﬀerent
networks in a ﬁrst step and, then, in a second step, link formation takes place within networks
based on observable individual characteristics only. An estimation procedure alike to a panel
within group estimator is thus able to control for these correlated eﬀects. One can get rid
of the network ﬁxed eﬀects by subtracting the network average from the individual-level
variables.17 A sd e t a i l e di nt h en e x ts e c t i o n ,t h i sp a p e rf o l l o w st h i sa p p r o a c h .
Finally, one might question the presence of problematic unobservable factors that are
not network-speciﬁc, but rather individual-speciﬁc. In this respect, the richness of the in-
formation provided by the AddHealth questionnaire on adolescents’ behavior allow us to
15These results are formally derived in Bramoullé et al. (2009) (see, in particular, their Proposition 3) and
used in Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009) and Lin (2010). Cohen-Cole (2006) presents a similar argument, i.e.
the use of out-group eﬀects, to achieve the identiﬁcation of the endogenous group eﬀect in the linear-in-means
model (see also Weinberg et al., 2004; Laschever, 2009).
16More technical results can be found in Liu and Lee (2010). Liu et al. (2011) explicitly study the case of
a non row-normalized adjacency matrix and provides the conditions on the parameters that guarantee the
identiﬁcation of peer eﬀects (similarly to the conditions derived by Bramoullé et al., 2009, who derive them
for the case of a row-normalized adjacency matrix).
17Bramoullé et al. (2009) also deal with this problem in the case of a row-normalized Gr matrix. In
their Proposition 5, they show that if the matrices I, Gr, G2
r and G3
r are linearly independent, then by
subtracting from the variables the network average (or the average over neighbors, i.e. direct friends), social
eﬀects are again identiﬁed and one can disentangle endogenous eﬀects from correlated eﬀects. In our dataset
this condition of linear independence is always satisﬁed.
12ﬁnd proxies for typically unobserved individual characteristics that may be correlated with
our variable of interest. Speciﬁcally, to control for diﬀerences in leadership propensity across
adolescents, we include an indicator of self-esteem a n da ni n d i c a t o ro ft h elevel of physical de-
velopment compared to peers, and we use mathematics score as an indicator of ability. Also,
we attempt to capture diﬀerences in attitude towards education, parenting and more general
social inﬂuences by including indicators of the student’s school attachment, relationship with
teachers, parental care and social inclusion.
In addition, we present an IV approach that uses as instruments only variables lagged in
time to ensure that the instruments are not correlated with the contemporaneous error term.
Observe that any unobserved source of heterogeneity that can be captured at the network
level is already taken into account by the inclusion of network ﬁxed eﬀects.
4.3 Econometric methodology
Our econometric methodology follows closely Liu and Lee (2010). Let us expose this approach
and highlight the modiﬁcation that is implemented in this paper.
Let Yr =( y1,r,···,y nr,r)0, Xr =( x1,r,···,x nr,r)0,a n d²r =(  1,r,···,  nr,r)0.D e n o t et h e
nr×nr sociomatrix by Gr =[ gij,r], the row-normalized of Gr by G∗
r,a n dt h enr-dimensional
vector of ones by lnr. Then model (5) can be written in matrix form as:
Yr = φGrYr + X
∗
rβ + ηrlnr + ²r, (6)
where X∗
r =( Xr,G∗
rXr) and β =( δ
0,γ0)0.





¯ r )0, ² =( ²0
1,···,²0
¯ r)0, G =D ( G1,···,G¯ r), ι =D ( ln1,···,ln¯ r) and
η =( η1,···,η¯ r)0,w h e r eD(A1,···,AK) is a block diagonal matrix in which the diago-
nal blocks are mk × nk matrices Ak’s. For the entire sample, the model is
Y = Zθ + ι · η + ², (7)
where Z =( GY,X∗) and θ =( φ,β
0)0.
We treat η as a vector of unknown parameters. When the number of networks ¯ r is large,
we have the incidental parameter problem. Let J =D ( J1,···,J¯ r),w h e r eJr = Inr− 1
nrl0
nrlnr.
The network ﬁxed eﬀect can be eliminated by a transformation with J such that:
JY = JZθ + J². (8)
Let M =( I−φG)−1. The equilibrium outcome vector Y in (7) is then given by the reduced
form equation:
Y = M(X
∗δ + ι · η)+M². (9)
13It follows that GY = GMX
∗β + GMιη + GM². GY is correlated with ² because
E[(GM²)0²]=σ2tr(GM) 6=0 . Hence, in general, (8) cannot be consistently estimated
by OLS.18 If G is row-normalized such that G·ln = ln,w h e r eln is a n-dimensional vector of
ones, the endogenous social interaction eﬀect can be interpreted as an average eﬀect. With a
row-normalized G, Lee et al. (2010) have proposed a partial-likelihood estimation approach
for the estimation based on the transformed model (8). However, for this empirical study,
w ea r ei n t e r e s t e di nt h eaggregate endogenous eﬀect instead of the average eﬀect. Hence,
row-normalization is not appropriate. Furthermore, we are also interested in the centrality
of networks that are captured by the variation in row sums in the adjacency matrix G.
Row-normalization could eliminate such information. If G i sn o tr o w - n o r m a l i z e da si ti s
in this empirical study, the (partial) likelihood function for (8) could not be derived, and
alternative estimation approaches need to be considered. Liu and Lee (2010) use an instru-
mental variable approach and propose diﬀerent estimators based on diﬀerent instrumental
matrices, denoted here by Q1, Q2 and Q3.T h e yﬁrst consider the 2SLS estimator based on
the conventional instrumental matrix for the estimation of (8): Q1 = J(GX
∗,X∗) (ﬁnite-IVs
2SLS). For the case that the adjacency matrix G is not row-normalized, Liu and Lee (2010)
then propose to use additional instruments (IVs) JGι and enlarge the instrumental matrix:
Q2 =( Q1,JGι) (many-IVs 2SLS). The additional IVs of JGι are based on the row sums of
G (i.e. the outdegrees of a network) and thus use the information on centrality of a network.
They show that those additional IVs could help model identiﬁcation when the conventional
IVs are weak and improve upon the estimation eﬃciency of the conventional 2SLS estimator
based on Q1. However, the number of such instruments depends on the number of networks.
If the number of networks grows with the sample size, so does the number of IVs. The 2SLS
could be asymptotic biased when the number of IVs increases too fast relative to the sample
size (see, e.g., Bekker, 1994; Bekker and van der Ploeg, 2005; Hansen et al., 2008). Liu and
Lee (2010) have shown that the proposed many-IV 2SLS estimator has a properly-centered
asymptotic normal distribution when the average group size needs to be large relative to
the number of networks in the sample. As detailed in Section 3, in this empirical study,
we have a number of small networks. Liu and Lee (2010) also propose a bias-correction
procedure based on the estimated leading-order many-IV bias: Q3 (bias-corrected 2SLS).
The bias-corrected many-IV 2SLS estimator is properly centered, asymptotically normally
distributed, and eﬃcient when the average group size is suﬃciently large. It is thus the more
18Lee (2002) has shown that the OLS estimator can be consistent in the spatial scenario where each spatial
unit is inﬂuenced by many neighbors whose inﬂuences are uniformly small. However, in the current data,
the number of neighbors are limited, and hence that result does not apply.
14appropriate estimator in our case study (see Liu and Lee (2010) for a detailed derivation and
an analysis of the asymptotic properties of the diﬀerent estimators).19
In this paper, we use these estimators and also implement a modiﬁcation of this approach,
which takes advantage of the longitudinal structure of our data. The exact equivalent of (5)
can be written in matrix form as:




r,t+1β2 + ηr,tlnr + ²r,t+1.
Our modiﬁcation of the IV approach proposed by Liu and Lee (2010) consists in including
in the diﬀerent instrumental matrices only values lagged in time (i.e. observed in wave




,t). Such a strategy should ensure that the instruments are not correlated with the
contemporaneous (wave IV) error term  t+1, thus strengthening our identiﬁcation strategy.
5 Estimation results
5.1 General results
Table 1 collects the estimation results of model (5) when using the diﬀerent estimators
discussed in the previous section, without using the information of the nomination order, i.e.
all nominated friends receive the same weight equals to 1.
As explained above, for the estimation of φ,w ep o o la l lt h en e t w o r k st o g e t h e rb yc o n -
structing a block-diagonal network matrix with the adjacency matrices from each network
on the diagonal block. Hence we implicitly assume that the φ in the empirical model is the
same for all networks. The diﬀerence between networks is controlled for by network ﬁxed
eﬀects. Indeed, the estimation of φ for each network might be diﬃcult (in terms of precision)
for the small networks. Furthermore, as stated above, it is a crucial empirical concern to
control for unobserved network heterogeneity by using network ﬁxed eﬀects.
Proposition (1) requires that φ is in absolute value smaller than the inverse of the largest
eigenvalue of the block-diagonal network matrix Gr, i.e. φ<1/μ(Gr). In our case, the
largest eigenvalue of Gr is 3.70 . Furthermore our theoretical model postulates that φ ≥ 0.A s
a result, we can accept values within the range [0,0.280). Table 1 shows, in the ﬁrst column,
the results obtained when using our most extensive set of instruments and, in column 2, those
produced when using as instruments only variables lagged in time. All our estimates of φ
19Liu and Lee (2010) also generalize this 2SLS approach to the GMM using additional quadratic moment
conditions.
15are within the acceptable parameter space [0,0.280) and are all signiﬁcant. Looking across
columns, it appears that the results are similar and only slightly higher in magnitude in the
second column. This ﬁnding (incidentally) validates the empirical identiﬁcation strategies
used by Lin (2010) and Liu et al. (2011). Indeed, given the extensive set of controls available
in the AddHealth, the inclusion of network ﬁxed eﬀects, and, most importantly, because
friendship networks are quite small (see Section 3), the presence of uncaptured (troubling)
individual unobserved within network characteristics is very unlikely. If these factors were
at work, we should have found a substantial diﬀerence between the results in the ﬁrst and
second column in Table 1, since the latter controls for such inﬂuences.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Looking now within each column, as explained above, in our case study with small
networks in the sample, the preferred estimator is the bias-corrected 2SLS one. Let us thus
focus on the bias-corrected estimator. First, the eﬀect of friends’ education on own education
is always signiﬁcant and positive, i.e., there are strong and persistent peer eﬀects in education.
This shows that the “quality” of friends (in terms of future educational achievement) from
high school has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on own future education level, even thought
it might be that individuals who were close friends in 1994-1995 (wave I) might not be
friends anymore in 2007-2008 (wave IV). In terms of magnitude, we ﬁnd that a standard
deviation increase in peers’ aggregate years of education (roughly two more high-school
graduate friends) translates into roughly a 10 percent increase of a standard deviation in the
individual’s education attainment (roughly 3.5 more months of education). This is a strong
eﬀect, especially given our long list of controls and the fact that friendship networks might
have changed over time. The inﬂuence of peers at school seem to be carried over time.
When the information on the nomination order is exploited (Table2), thus allowing to
weight diﬀerently best friends, the magnitude of the eﬀects is higher. A standard deviation
increase in peers’ education attainment translates into roughly a 15 percent increase of
a standard deviation in the individual’s education attainment (roughly 6 more months of
education).20
[Insert Table 2 here]
20When Gr is weighted the largest eigenvalue is 2.59. We can thus accept values within the range [0,0.385).
All our estimates of φ in Table 2 are within this parameter space.
165.2 Additional results
We have seen so far that friends at school have an impact on own future educational outcome.
We would like to understand better what is behind this result. Is it the case that the choice
to go to college is aﬀected by the choice of peers? Or is it the case that hanging out with
friends who study hard increase one’s motivation to study and therefore the choice to go to
college? With our dataset, it is diﬃcult to pin down the exact mechanism behind our peer
eﬀect results. We can, however, improve our understanding of the results.
The students who were interviewed in wave I (1994-1995) in the AddHealth survey were
in fact in diﬀerent grades. We would like now to see if the peer eﬀect results are stronger for
friends in earlier grades than in later ones. For that, we split our sample between students
who were in grades 7-9 and those who were in grades 10-12 in wave I and estimate model (5)
on these two sub-samples separately. The results are contained in Tables 3 and 4, for grades
7-9 and Tables 5 and 6 for grades 10-12. We consider again unweighted networks (Tables 3
and 5) and weighted networks (Tables 4 and 6). We ﬁnd that in the early grades peer eﬀects
do not seem to be at work (Table 3), not even when the inﬂuence of peers is weighted by
the order of nomination (Table 4). On the contrary, when we consider friendships occurring
only in the two last years of high school (grades 10-12), then eﬀects of peers’ education on
own education become signiﬁcant (Tables 5 and 6) and very large in magnitude.
[Insert Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 here]
This suggests that friendships made earlier in life do not last or do not aﬀect educational
choices made after high school while this is the not case for friendships made later in life. This
also indicates that social norms are important in educational choice since the individual’s
choice of college seems to be inﬂuenced by the choice of college of friends in the two last years
of high school. In other words, individuals are more likely to adopt and pursue an objective
(here educational choice) if this choice is popular among their peers, especially in the last
years at school. This could represent the eﬀect of contagion and collective socialization. This
result is in line with that of Zax and Rees (2002) who, using the Wisconsin Longitudinal
Study of Social and Psychological Factors in Aspiration and Attainment (WLS), ﬁnd that
the college aspirations of friends are positively and signiﬁcantly related to respondents’ later
earnings.
176 Policy implications
The presence of peer eﬀects provides opportunities for policies aiming at improving social
welfare (Hoxby, 2000). If one wants to implement an eﬀective education policy, it needs to
internalize peer eﬀects. For instance, education vouchers could lead to a more eﬃcient human
capital investment proﬁle (see e.g., Epple and Romano 1998; Nechyba 2000). Policies such
as school desegregation, busing, magnet schools, Moving to Opportunity programs21 could
also be eﬀective if the government understands the magnitude and nature of peer eﬀects in
student outcomes. For example, if low ability students beneﬁt from the presence of superior
peers, while high ability students are not harmed by the presence of disadvantaged peers,
then mixing students of diﬀerent ability levels can generate social gains.
As noted by Manski (1993, 2000) and Moﬃtt (2001), it is, however, important to sep-
arately identify peer or endogenous eﬀects from contextual or exogenous eﬀects. This is
because endogenous eﬀects generate a social multiplier while contextual eﬀect don’t. In the
context of education, this means that a special program targeting some individuals will have
multiplier eﬀects: the individual aﬀected by the program will improve his/her grades and will
inﬂuence the grades of his/her peers, which, in turn, will aﬀect the grades of his/her peers,
and so on. On the other hand, if only contextual eﬀects are present, then there will be no
social multiplier eﬀects from any policy aﬀecting only the “context” (for example, improving
the quality of the teachers at school). Therefore, the identiﬁcation of these two eﬀects is of
paramount importance for policy purposes. Another important policy issue in the estimation
of social interactions is the separation between peer eﬀects and confounding eﬀects. Indeed,
the formation of peer group is not random and individuals do select into groups of friends.
It is therefore important to separate the endogenous peer eﬀects from the correlated eﬀects
(Manski, 1993), i.e. the same educational outcomes may be due to common unobservable
v a r i a b l e s( s u c ha s ,f o re x a m p l e ,t h ef a c tt h a ti n d i v i d u a l sf r o mt h es a m en e t w o r kl i k eb o w l i n g
together) faced by individuals belonging to the same network rather than peer eﬀects. This
is also very important for education policies since, for example, if high grades are due to
the fact that teenagers like to bowling together, then obviously the implications are very
diﬀerent than if it is due to peer eﬀects.
One of the main aims of this paper was to clearly identify the peer eﬀects from the
contextual aﬀects and from the correlated eﬀects. For that, we ﬁrst developed a theoretical
m o d e lw h e r ea l lt h e s ee ﬀects were clearly separated. We then estimated the results of the
model by using an econometric techniques, which utilizes the structure of the network as
21See Lang (2007) for an overview of these policies in the U.S.
18well as network ﬁxed eﬀects to identify each of these eﬀects. We analyzed the impact of the
friends’ educational attainment on an individual’s educational attainment where friendship
was determined when this individual was a school adolescent while educational attainment
was measured when the individual and his/her friends were adults. We ﬁnd that there are
strong and persistent peer eﬀects in education and that the relevant peers are the friends
in grade 10-12. This suggests that individuals are more likely to adopt and pursue college
studies if this choice is popular among their peers, especially in the last years at school.
This could represent the eﬀect of contagion and collective socialization and mean that any
education policy targeting some speciﬁc individuals will have multiplier eﬀects.
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23Appendix 1: Data appendix 
 
Table A.1: Description of Data (1,319 individuals, 138 networks) 
 
 Variable  definition  Mean  St.dev  Min  Max 
          
Wave IV (aged 24 - 32)          
Years in Education      16.31 3.19  9  26 
Years in Education  of peers   Aggregate value of years in education over 
nominated direct friends. 
40.24 27.79  9  187 
Married  Dummy variable taking value one if the 
respondent is married. 
0.45 0.50  0  1 
Age  Respondent’s age  28.5 1.72  25  33 
Son or Daughter  Dummy variable taking value one if the 
respondent has a son or daughter. 
0.47 0.50  0  1 
Religion practice   Response to the question: “How often have you 
attended religious services in the past 12 
months?”, coded as 0= never, 1= a few times, 
2= once a month, 3= 2 or 3 times a month, 
4=once a week, 5=more than once a week.  
1.72 1.63  0  5 
Wave I (grade 7 - 12)          
Individual socio-demographic variables          
Female  Dummy variable taking value one if the 
respondent is female. 
0.53 0.50  0  1 
Black or African American  Race dummies. “White” is the reference group.  0.17 0.37  0  1 
Other races  Race dummies. “White” is the reference group.  0.05 0.23  0  1 
Student grade  Grade of student in the current year.  9.14 1.68  7  12 
Religion practice   Response to the question: "In the past 12 
months, how often did you attend religious 
services", coded as 4= never, 3= less than once 
a month, 2= once a month or more, but less 
than once a week, 1= once a week or more. 
Coded as 5 if the previous is skipped because 
of response “none” to the question: “What is 
your religion?”  
2.16 1.38  1  5 
Mathematics score A  Dummies for scores in mathematics at the most 
recent grading period, coded (A, B, C, D or 
lower, missing). 
0.29 0.45  0  1 
Mathematics score B  Dummies for scores in mathematics at the most 
recent grading period, coded (A, B, C, D or 
lower, missing). 
0.34 0.47  0  1 
Mathematics score C  Dummies for scores in mathematics at the most 
recent grading period, coded (A, B, C, D or 
lower, missing). 
0.20 0.40  0  1 
Mathematics score D or lower  Dummies for scores in mathematics at the most 
recent grading period, coded (A, B, C, D or 
lower, missing). 
0.11 0.32  0  1 
Mathematics score missing  Dummies for scores in mathematics at the most 
recent grading period, coded (A, B, C, D or 
lower, missing). 
0.05 0.21  0  1 
Self esteem  Response to the question: “Compared with 
other people your age, how intelligent are 
you”, coded as 1= moderately below average, 
2= slightly below average, 3= about average, 
4= slightly above average, 5= moderately 
above average, 6= extremely above average. 
4.01 1.08  1  6 
Physical development  Response to the question: "How advanced is 
your physical development compared to other 
boys/girls your age", coded as 1= I look 
younger than most, 2= I look younger than 
some, 3= I look about average, 4= I look older 
than some, 5= I look older than most 
3.34 1.11  1  5 
Family background variables          
Household size  Number of people living in the household.   4.39 1.35  2  11 
Two married parent family  Dummy taking value one if the respondent 
lives in a household with two parents (both 
biological and non biological) that are married. 
0.73 0.44  0  1 
Parent education  Schooling level of the (biological or non-
biological) parent who is living with the child, 
distinguishing between “never went to school”, 
“not graduate from high school”, “high school 
graduate”, “graduated from college or a 
university”, “professional training beyond a 
four-year college”, coded as 1 to 5. We 
consider only the education of the father if both 
parents are in the household. 
3.18 1.08  0  5 Parent occupation manager  Parent occupation dummies. Closest 
description of the job of (biological or non-
biological) parent that is living with the child is 
manager. If both parents are in the household, 
the occupation of the father is considered. 
“none” is the reference group 
0.11 0.31  0  1 
Parent occupation professional/technical  Parent occupation dummies. Closest 
description of the job of (biological or non-
biological) parent that is living with the child is 
manager. If both parents are in the household, 
the occupation of the father is considered. 
“none” is the reference group 
0.20 0.40  0  1 
Parent occupation office or sales worker  Parent occupation dummies. Closest 
description of the job of (biological or non-
biological) parent that is living with the child is 
manager. If both parents are in the household, 
the occupation of the father is considered. 
“none” is the reference group 
0.11 0.31  0  1 
Parent occupation manual  Parent occupation dummies. Closest 
description of the job of (biological or non-
biological) parent that is living with the child is 
manager. If both parents are in the household, 
the occupation of the father is considered. 
“none” is the reference group 
0.31 0.46  0  1 
Parent occupation military or security  Parent occupation dummies. Closest 
description of the job of (biological or non-
biological) parent that is living with the child is 
manager. If both parents are in the household, 
the occupation of the father is considered. 
“none” is the reference group 
0.02 0.15  0  1 
Parent occupation farm or fishery  Parent occupation dummies. Closest 
description of the job of (biological or non-
biological) parent that is living with the child is 
manager. If both parents are in the household, 
the occupation of the father is considered. 
“none” is the reference group 
0.03 0.16  0  1 
Parent occupation other  Parent occupation dummies. Closest 
description of the job of (biological or non-
biological) parent that is living with the child is 
manager. If both parents are in the household, 
the occupation of the father is considered. 
“none” is the reference group 
0.13 0.34  0  1 
Protective factors          
School attachment  Response to the question: "You feel like you 
are part of your school coded as 1= strongly 
agree, 2= agree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 
4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree.  
1.90 0.92  1  5 
Relationship with teachers  Response to the question: “How often have you 
had trouble getting along with your teachers?” 
0= never, 1= just a few times, 2= about once a 
week, 3= almost everyday, 4=everyday 
0.89 0.91  0  4 
Social inclusion  Response to the question: "How much do you 
feel that adults care about you, coded as 5= 
very much, 4= quite a bit, 3= somewhat, 2= 
very little, 1= not at all 
4.47 0.74  1  5 
Parental care  Dummy taking value one if the respondent 
reports that the (biological or non-biological) 
parent that is living with her/him or at least one 
of the parents if both are in the household cares 
very much about her/him 
0.92 0.28  0  1 
Residential neighborhood variables          
Residential building quality  Interviewer response to the question "How well 
kept is the building in which the respondent 
lives", coded as 4= very poorly kept (needs 
major repairs), 3= poorly kept (needs minor 
repairs), 2= fairly well kept (needs cosmetic 
work), 1= very well kept. 
1.52 0.79  1  4 
Residential area suburban  Residential area type dummies: interviewer's 
description of the immediate area or street (one 
block, both sides) where the respondent lives. 
“Rural area” is the reference group.  
0.30 0.46  0  1 
Residential area urban - residential only  Residential area type dummies: interviewer's 
description of the immediate area or street (one 
block, both sides) where the respondent lives. 
“Rural area” is the reference group. 
0.23 0.42  0  1 
Residential area other type  Residential area type dummies: interviewer's 
description of the immediate area or street (one 
block, both sides) where the respondent lives. 
“Rural area” is the reference group. 
0.02 0.12  0  1 
 Figure 1: Correlations between own education and peers’ education 
 
   Notes: Network links are defined using the choices made (out-degree). The plotted 
   correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level.  Table 1: Estimation Results –peer effects- 
-unweighted networks- 
 
  Total IV   Lagged IV 
    




    




    




    
Individual socio-demographic variables  yes  yes 
Family background variables  yes  yes 
Protective factors  yes  yes 
Residential neighborhood variables  yes  yes 
Contextual effects  yes  yes 
Network fixed effects  yes  yes 
    
1,319 individuals over 138 networks.    
    
Notes: Estimation has been performed using Matlab. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 












 Table 2: Estimation Results –peer effects- 
-weighted networks- 
 
  Total IV   Lagged IV 
    




    




    




    
Individual socio-demographic variables  yes  yes 
Family background variables  yes  yes 
Protective factors  yes  yes 
Residential neighborhood variables  yes  yes 
Contextual effects  yes  yes 
Network fixed effects  yes  yes 
    
1,319 individuals over 138 networks.    
    
Notes: Estimation has been performed using Matlab. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 












 Table 3: Estimation Results –peer effects- 
Unweighted networks 
Grade 7-9 
  Total IV   Lagged IV 
    




    




    




    
Individual socio-demographic variables  yes  yes 
Family background variables  yes  yes 
Protective factors  yes  yes 
Residential neighborhood variables  yes  yes 
Contextual effects  yes  yes 
Network fixed effects  yes  yes 
    
713 individuals over 80 networks    
Notes: Estimation has been performed using Matlab. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 













 Table 4: Estimation Results –peer effects- 
weighted networks 
Grade 7-9 
  Total IV   Lagged IV 
    




    




    




    
Individual socio-demographic variables  yes  yes 
Family background variables  yes  yes 
Protective factors  yes  yes 
Residential neighborhood variables  yes  yes 
Contextual effects  yes  yes 
Network fixed effects  yes  yes 
    
713 individuals over 80 networks    
Notes: Estimation has been performed using Matlab. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 













 Table 5: Estimation Results –peer effects- 
Unweighted networks 
Grade 10-12 
  Total IV   Lagged IV 
    




    




    




    
Individual socio-demographic variables  yes  yes 
Family background variables  yes  yes 
Protective factors  yes  yes 
Residential neighborhood variables  yes  yes 
Contextual effects  yes  yes 
Network fixed effects  yes  yes 
    
492 individuals over 55 networks    
Notes: Estimation has been performed using Matlab. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 














Table 6: Estimation Results –peer effects- 
weighted networks 
Grade 10-12 
  Total IV   Lagged IV 
    




    




    




    
Individual socio-demographic variables  yes  yes 
Family background variables  yes  yes 
Protective factors  yes  yes 
Residential neighborhood variables  yes  yes 
Contextual effects  yes  yes 
Network fixed effects  yes  yes 
    
492 individuals over 55 networks    
Notes: Estimation has been performed using Matlab. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 